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NEWS AND VIEWS
Protecting and Promoting Privacy in an Uncertain World:
Further Defences of Ignorance and the Right Not to Know
GRAEME T. LAURIE
Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Introduction
I welcome the opportunity to respond to the article by Dr Canellopoulou
Bottis which discusses my work ‘In Defence of Ignorance: Genetic
Information and the Right Not to Know’
1
, and I would like to extend my
thanks to her and to the European Journal of Health Law for giving me cause
to reflect once more on my arguments concerning genetic privacy and the
right not to know. 
Ethics and Law
Let us begin with a point of agreement. Dr Canellopoulou Bottis argues that
the answer to my hypothetical example ‘...cannot, should not be found in law,
at least not only...’. I find it easy to agree with this statement. Indeed, as a
medical lawyer I baulk at the idea of medical law which is not informed by
ethics and ethical discourse and which does not reflect the fundamental values
and principles of our society. A theme of my paper was, in fact, to stress the
need to have proper reflection and discussion about the appropriate legal
responses which should emerge in light of the problems thrown up by
advances in genetics. In that process ethics has a crucial role to play. By
corollary, I am more than willing to admit that the law does not necessarily
have a role to play on every occasion.
This having been said, Dr Canellopoulou Bottis focuses much of her paper
on the legal concept of duty (to disclose) and cites a number of legal cases in
support of her argument. It is fitting, therefore, to discuss the possible nature
of any duty to family members in respect of genetic information, especially
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since I disagree with my colleague’s analysis in several respects. This is so
even although I do not argue in my previous work that any duty to disclose
should be imposed on health care professionals.
Law: A Duty to Disclose?
Dr Canellopoulou Bottis raises a question over the ‘uniqueness’ of genetic
information and using that uniqueness as a basis for establishing a duty to
disclose: ‘the obligation to disclose does not depend on the nature of the
information, be it genetic or not’. We are talking here about the action of
negligence and the existence of a duty of care. Common law courts use the
duty of care as a ‘threshold device’
2
to establish the limits of liability; only
when a duty of care is imposed can liability ultimately flow in respect of
careless action or inaction. In the tripartite relationship under discussion,
where the question to be determined is whether the health care professional
(A) owes a duty of care to the patient's sister (C), Dr Canellopoulou Bottis
relies heavily on the U.S. Tarasoff decision
3
in which the University of
California was held liable for the failure of one of its therapists to protect a
young woman from one of his patients who had voiced thoughts about
murdering her. While it might be tempting to see our genetics scenario in
terms of the dynamic in Tarasoff, it is utterly erroneous to do so in law. For,
the primary reason why a duty of care was imposed in Tarasoff was because
of the unique relationship which existed between the therapist and his patient.
In particular, the ability of the therapist actually to control his patient's
conduct – for example, by having him committed – was instrumental in the
Supreme Court of California finding that a duty of care was owed to a third
party outside of the therapeutic relationship. Moreover, the duty which was
imposed was not a duty to warn but rather a duty to protect the third party
from the conduct of the patient
4
. Thus, the authority in Tarasoff cannot be used
in respect of the HIV example offered, nor indeed in respect of genetic
information, for in neither case is the health care professional in a position to
control the conduct of his patients. And, in the context of genetic information
the analogy is removed one stage further because in no way can the conduct
of one relative cause genetic harm to any other living relative. The harm, if it
is to be seen as genetic disease, has already been done. At best then, a health
care professional can only prevent a relative from losing a chance of therapy
or survival if disclosure is made in circumstances when therapy or a cure are
available
5
. The hurdle remains, however, one of imposing a prima facie duty
of care on a health care professional to the genetic relatives of his patients.
In certain U.S. states the courts have cleared this hurdle and have
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concentrated on the unique familial nature of genetic information to impose a
duty to disclose on health care professionals (HCPs). Thus, in Schroeder v
Perkel
6
the court said, "[t]he foreseeability of injury to members of a family
other than one immediately injured by the wrongdoing of another must be
viewed in light of the legal relationships among family members. A family is
woven of the fibers of life; if one strand is damaged, the whole structure may
suffer. The filaments of family life, although individually spun, create a web
of interconnected legal interests’. And more recently, the Superior Court of
New Jersey held in Safer v Estate of Pack
7
that a direct duty existed between
a health care professional and the children of a patient who was suffering from
retroperitoneal cancer with multiple polyposis of the colon to warn the
children of the immediate risk to their own health: ‘[a]lthough an overly broad
and general application of the physician’s duty to warn might lead to
confusion, conflict or unfairness in many types of circumstances, we are
confident that the duty to warn of avertible risk from genetic causes, by
definition a matter of familial concern, is sufficiently narrow to serve the
interests of justice’
8
. The relevance of the nature of the information was key
to the foundation of the duty. The strongly hereditary influence of multiple
polyposis alerted the health care professional to a specific and easily
identifiable class of persons who were at increased risk. Moreover, that class
of persons was restricted (being blood relatives of the patient) and so to allow
the action did not raise the prospect of opening liability to an unlimited group
of potential litigants. Thus the nature of the information founds the duty and
determines its scope.
This having been said, it is important to realise that policy factors operate
to constrain the courts in their extensions of civil liability. Importantly, social,
economic, moral and ethical factors are taken into account whenever an
extension of the law is proposed. Thus we see, for example, in Ellis v Peter
9
the Supreme Court of New York refused to recognise a duty on the part of a
health care professional to the spouse of a patient who had contracted
tuberculosis (but who had been wrongly diagnosed) because ‘a physician’s
duty of care is ordinarily one owed to his or her patient and does not extend
to the community at large; the wife may also be considered to be in that class
of persons whom the defendant knew or reasonably should have known were
relying on him for a duty of care to his patient, but defendant's duty of care
will not be so extended, since there is no indication of the point where that
duty would end.’
10
The limits of liability in such cases are decided primarily
by reference to policy. In the context of genetic information, several
considerations should be immediately apparent. These include the burden
which a duty would place on HCPs, the difficulty in knowing who should be
contacted and how
11
, and the possible detrimental effect which such a duty
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would have on the physician-patient relationship if confidentiality could be
disregarded in favour of the duty to disclose
12
. But, of most importance in the
present context, the courts should not rely unquestioningly on an assumption
that non-disclosure is necessarily a (legal) ‘harm’. As I argued in my original
work, the interest in not knowing can be very important, and it will not be
served by imposing a duty on health care professionals to make disclosures
without first considering the consequences, for both the patient and the
relatives to whom disclosure will be made. My conclusion is, therefore, that
one way to recognise and protect the interest in not knowing would be to
refuse to endorse the extension of tort law to impose a duty to disclose
13
. 
Ethics: Questioning Existing Principles and Exploring New
Options 
The ethical basis for my argument in support of a “right” not to know attempts
to expose the limits of the concepts of autonomy and confidentiality in
recognising and protecting the full range of interests which are at stake when
we ask the question, how should we regulate control of, and access to, familial
genetic information? The fundamental ethical principle of respect for persons
is undeniably a key to resolving these issues from an ethical perspective, but
I do not believe that the manifestation of that respect in rigid adherence to the
concept of individual autonomy is the only, or indeed the most appropriate,
means to address the problems under scrutiny. Dr Canellopoulou Bottis
correctly identifies ‘choice’ as central to the exercise of autonomy, and she
sees the right of patients to exercise choice as something akin to a trump
ethical value in the resolution of our dilemma. But, of course, the principle of
respect for persons requires only that we respect a person’s choices once they
are made and/or that we do not interfere in the decision-making process once
it is embarked upon. The objection which is voiced to my thesis is that it
serves to deprive persons of choice, and as such is paternalistic and
unjustifiable. But my concern is this: how should we act when we do not know
what people will choose? Certainly, one way to respect persons is to respect
any choices they might make about their health care when they themselves
have sought out the expertise of an HCP, but when they have not approached
such a person, and when we have no indication of the choices which they
might make about their future health care – which might well include a choice
not to know – I do not see how it is respectful effectively to coerce someone
into a position of having to make a choice, for example, by taking a genetic
test, or undergoing a double mastectomy, or by having a termination of
pregnancy. Dr Canellopoulou Bottis is concerned with facilitating choices
189NEWS AND VIEWS
and her justifications lie just as much in paternalistic practices as do any
justifications to respect an interest in not knowing. Let us not be unclear about
this.
I full endorse any argument which supports protection for patient choices.
But in our scenario no choices have been made. Our dilemma, therefore, is
one of whether we should disclose information in order to facilitate certain
choices when we do not know if they will be made at all, or whether we should
respect an interest which patients might have in not knowing information
about themselves. At no point have I argued that a “right not to know” is more
important that autonomy and choice, as Dr Canellopoulou Bottis suggests.
Rather, my concern is that we should be aware of the possible existence of an
interest in not knowing information, and that in certain cases we should
respect that interest and not disclose genetic information. An autonomy
analysis is flawed in this regard because it does not permit us to respect the
person's state of no(n)-knowledge. Autonomy requires choice and choice
requires information through disclosure. In seeking to further autonomy the
interest in not knowing is thereby automatically thwarted. 
The concept of confidentiality is similarly ill-suited to assist in the
resolution of our dilemma. And, with due respect, Dr Canellopoulou Bottis
misunderstands my point in this regard. I wish to explore the extent to which
confidentiality can protect the interest in not knowing; her submissions relate
to the extent to which the limits of the duty of confidentiality can justify
disclosure to family members. I whole-heartedly agree that disclosures can be
justified – indeed, this is precisely my concern – and my conclusion is that the
concept of confidentiality itself cannot protect those to whom disclosure will
be made from the burden of such knowledge. This having been said, the duty
of confidentiality does not impose on HCPs a duty to disclose
14
as seems to
be suggested. Rather, and at best, an HCP is accorded a discretion to disclose.
None the less, I would submit that recognition of the interest in not knowing
should serve to temper the exercise of such a discretion.
These conclusions leave us with a conceptual void in terms of how we can
make sense of the full range of interests which are at stake, and in particular
of the interest in not knowing. My concept of spatial privacy represents one
way of filling that void. I do not consider, however, that this view of privacy
has any more value than other ethical principles. I argue only that it should be
given due recognition and should be invoked in appropriate circumstances to
be weighed in the balance of all ethical considerations. The question of
whether we should ever develop a legal ‘right’ not to know requires much
more debate. The concept of 'right' which I envision is one in the realm of
negative rights. A spatial privacy right would be one which would entitle the
right holder to respect for their state of separateness from others. It is a right
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of non-interference. Thus, it is not accurate to suggest, as Dr. Canellopoulou
Bottis does, that in our scenario it is the HCP who ‘exercises’ the right on
behalf of the relatives. Rather, he would ‘respect’ their right and their interest
in not knowing by not disclosing the genetic information, in much the same
way we respect individuals’ liberty interests by not watching them
clandestinely. The effectiveness of a legal right not to know would be relevant
if the right were infringed, at which point those who are the subject of the right
could seek a remedy. It would also be meaningful to talk of the right not to
know when the right holders are aware that there is something to know but
they would rather not know it. Here there is a choice not to know – arguably
an exercise of autonomy which protects privacy interests – and this form of
privacy right is the focus of the European Convention and the UNESCO
Declaration. Dr Canellopoulou Bottis is entirely correct to point out that these
instruments focus on the autonomy of individuals, but I would not argue that
autonomy and privacy are necessarily mutually exclusive. I offer the example
of these legal documents to demonstrate that the interest in not knowing has
already been recognised at the international level, at least in part. However, it
is important to realise that these instruments only protect privacy interests to
the extent that autonomy and privacy overlap. The overriding concern of my
paper was to show that autonomy cannot fully protect all privacy interests at
stake, and it should not be expected to do so. In the absence of a means to
exercise choice meaningfully while not interfering unduly with the interest in
not knowing, I find the solution in spatial privacy and I leave the reader to
judge the merits of that concept for him/herself.
Finally, I find myself once again in agreement with Dr Canellopoulou
Bottis. We are not poles apart in the end points which we support. While my
colleague argues for ‘beneficence’ in her article – to which she attributes the
meaning ‘do no harm’ – I would suggest rather that we are both concerned
with ‘non-maleficence’: avoiding harm in dealing with patients and their
relatives. However, the divergent means that we each advocate to achieve this
end will undoubtedly remain the subject of much debate in the years to
come
15
.     
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